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The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important 
consequences for labor markets. Knowledge about the determinants of reciprocal effort choices is, 
however, incomplete. We investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in 
workers’ performance in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one-time job. We 
show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the 
hourly wage increases, while those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not 
change their performance. Moreover, we find that only workers who display positive reciprocity in a 
lab experiment show reciprocal performance responses in the field, while workers who lack positive 
reciprocity in the lab do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base 
wage. Our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers’ 
performance response to a wage increase. They are the first direct evidence of the fair-wage effort 
hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature. 
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Throughout the history of economics, many prominent economists pointed out that fairness 
concerns may influence labor market outcomes (Hicks, 1932; Marshall, 1890; Slichter, 1929).1 The 
presence of fair-minded workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort may have 
important consequences for the functioning of labor markets. Concerns for fairness may give rise to 
non-competitive wage premiums and involuntary unemployment (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990). Fairness concerns may also change firms’ internal pay structure and wage setting over time 
(Cabrales, Calvó-Armengol and Pavoni, 2008), and they can influence the effects of labor market 
policies such as minimum wage legislations (Falk, Fehr and Zehnder, 2006).  
The nature of how wages affect effort is key to understanding important phenomena in the 
labor market, such as downward wage rigidity as opposed to general rigidness of wages (Akerlof et 
al., 1996; Fehr and Goette, 2005). In this paper, we test directly for the psychological mechanisms 
underlying workers’ response to a wage increase in a large-scale field experiment. There is thus far a 
lack of evidence of how fairness perceptions modulate the effort response to a wage increase. 
Understanding the psychological mechanisms behind how wages affect effort has important 
consequences for theory. The simplest way of incorporating fairness concerns is to assume that 
workers generally consider higher wages to be fairer as in Akerlof (1984); This model predicts a 
general rigidness of wages with respect to economic conditions. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) take a 
different approach based on intuitions derived from the social psychology and sociology literature. 
In their model, they assume workers have a fair reference wage in mind. Wage increases up to the 
fair wage are assumed to induce workers to exert more effort because higher wages up to this wage 
limit are perceived to be fairer. In contrast, pay raises above the fair wage are assumed to have no 
impact on effort because workers already feel fairly treated. The key idea behind this model is that 
wage increases only affect workers’ effort if they alleviate perceived underpayment. This asymmetry 
has important implications for the labor market. It predicts an asymmetry in how wages react to 
labor market conditions. While competitive upward-pressures will always raise wages, firms may be 
reluctant to take advantage of deteriorating labor-market conditions, because pushing the wage 
below what is perceived to be the fair wage may trigger effort reductions and thus offset the benefit 
of charging lower wages.  
 Our paper also contributes to a recent empirical controversy. The evidence from laboratory 
experiments generally supports the notion that workers exert extra effort on average when they are 
paid a more generous wage (Brandts and Charness, 2004; Charness, 2000; Charness, Frechette and 
                                                            
1 Slichter (1929) claimed, for example, that companies in the 1920s deliberately pursued a “high wage” policy as they were 
convinced that paying workers a wage they consider to be fairer would increase productivity, reduce turnover, and prevent 
labor strikes (p. 431). 
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Kagel, 2004; Cooper and Kagel, 2009; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Hannan, Kagel and Moser, 
2002). Results from recent field studies is more mixed (Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Gneezy and 
List, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt, Sadrieh and Rockenbach, 2010; Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 2012; Kube, 
Maréchal and Puppe, forthcoming). These conflicting findings are sometimes taken as evidence that 
results from the laboratory do not generalize to natural environments, and that the psychological 
mechanisms identified in the lab may be irrelevant in the field. 
We conducted a controlled field experiment to examine how wage increases affect workers’ 
fairness assessment of their pay and how this translates into changes in their effort. Our experiment 
took place in the context of a sales promotion. A publishing company hired workers for a one-time 
job. Their task was to distribute copies of a newly launched newspaper at train stations and other 
public places. We implemented two treatments in collaboration with the publishing company using a 
within-subjects design. In the baseline treatment, the workers received an hourly base wage of CHF 
22.2 In the main treatment, we increased workers’ pay by CHF 5 per hour, raising their hourly wage 
to CHF 27. A comparison of the productivity difference between the two treatments allows us to 
identify the causal impact of the wage increase on workers’ average performance. We also 
conducted a survey to measure workers’ fairness perceptions of their wage during the experiment 
and two months afterwards. During the follow-up survey the workers also participated in a 
“laboratory” two-player game with real monetary stakes which allowed us to measure workers’ 
preferences for reciprocity. We can identify and interpret heterogeneous treatment responses by 
combining the additional data with the data from the field experiment. 
We find that the wage increase has on average a positive and significant effect on workers’ 
productivity. But the average effect hides substantial individual heterogeneity in the extent to which 
workers reciprocate the wage increase. The wage increase causes an increase in the average 
productivity for those workers who feel underpaid at the base wage. In contrast, adequately or 
overpaid workers do not respond to the wage increase. The effect is stable over time, and not driven 
by skill differences that may also determine fairness judgments. This result implies that wage 
increases up to the level that workers consider to be fair lead to an increase in average effort, while 
pay raises above this level have no impact on effort. In addition, we find that those workers whom 
we identify as non-reciprocal individuals in the laboratory two-player game also act in a non-
reciprocal manner in the field experiment, i.e., they do not respond to the wage increase, 
irrespective of whether they feel underpaid or not. In contrast, those workers whom we identify as 
                                                            
2 CHF 22 is roughly the hourly wage that is paid in this area of Switzerland for simple tasks. For example, cleaning ladies in 
private households typically earn an hourly wage of CHF 20-25. Students who participate in laboratory experiments earn 
roughly CHF 25 per hour.  
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reciprocal types in the two-player game provide higher effort in response to the wage increase if 
they feel underpaid at the base wage. 
In view of the fact that the workers knew from the outset that the job for the newspaper’s 
launch was a one-time job that would last only a few weeks, it is unlikely that reputational or 
repeated game effects affected our results. In principle, the assumption that workers are fair-
minded is not necessary to explain a positive relationship between wage and effort levels (MacLeod 
and Malcomson, 1989; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). These 
alternative theories rely, however, on the assumption of long-term employment relations, which is 
clearly ruled out in our setting.3 In addition, these theories predict that selfish workers without any 
preference for reciprocal fairness respond in a reciprocal manner to the wage increase. Our data 
show, however, that the selfish or non-reciprocal workers do not respond to the wage increase with 
increased performance. These theories are thus unable to explain why only the workers who exhibit 
a preference for reciprocal fairness (in the laboratory experiment) respond to the wage increase. 
Finally, these theories also have problems explaining the role of fairness perceptions. In a long run 
relationship, the workers who feel well-paid – because they earn a job rent – lose the most when 
they are fired. Therefore, those who feel well paid or overpaid should react more strongly to a pay 
raise than those who feel underpaid because the former have more to lose if fired.  
Our experiment further develops the methodology of field experiments in labor-market 
settings (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube et al., 2012; Kube et al., 
forthcoming). First, we measured workers’ fairness perceptions during and after the experiment. 
This information is important because it helps us understand the relationship between wage 
changes and fairness perceptions and the link between fairness perceptions and effort choices. A 
common result in the studies mentioned above is that increases in hourly wages have a small and 
insignificant average effect on workers’ performance. One reason for the lack of a significant effect 
in these studies may be that the experimenters paid a rather high base wage compared to the 
market wage for comparable jobs.4 We know from our data that higher wages decrease the share of 
workers who feel underpaid. It is thus possible that only a relatively small number of workers felt 
underpaid at the base wage in the previous field experiments and that a crucial condition for 
reciprocal effort choices therefore may have been absent.  
                                                            
3 Strictly speaking, these models are based on the assumption of infinitely repeated interactions between the firm and the 
workers. 
4 In Kube, Marechal and Puppe (2010a) the base wage was EUR 15, while it amounted to EUR 12 in Kube, Marechal and 
Puppe (2010b). Students from the University of Karlsruhe (Germany) participated in the field experiment in both studies. 
The typical hourly wage for research assistants at this university is EUR 8, and the students earned on average EUR 10.5 per 
hour in previous employment relations. The hourly base wage in the library task of Gneezy and List (2006) was USD 12, 
while the typical market wage for similar activities was USD 7 (verbal communication by Uri Gneezy). Thus, the base wage 
in these studies is already quite generous compared to typical alternative employment opportunities. It thus seems 
possible that only few workers felt underpaid at the base wage.  
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Second, we measured workers’ preferences for reciprocity by conducting a two-player, 
sequential-move game with them. There is strong laboratory evidence suggesting that individuals’ 
preferences for reciprocity are rather heterogeneous — while many individuals exhibit such a 
preference, a substantial share of subjects also acts rather selfishly and rarely (or never) returns a 
favor when doing so is costly (Bellemare, Kroeger and Van Soest, 2008; Bellemare, Kroger and van 
Soest, 2011; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr et al., 1993). Our laboratory measure of individuals’ 
preferences for reciprocity allows us to go beyond documenting an average effect of a wage increase 
and helps us understand the reasons behind heterogeneous effort responses.  
Third, our study offers better precision due to a large sample. One reason for the lack of a 
significant effect in the other studies may be the limited statistical power to identify treatment 
effects due to the relatively small sample sizes with a maximum of 30 subjects per treatment. 
Although our average effect size is also modest, our larger sample of 196 workers allows us to reject 
the null hypothesis despite conservative calculations of standard errors that allow the residual to be 
correlated temporally as well as spatially. Another reason for our significant results may be that our 
measures for individuals’ fairness perceptions, fairness preferences, and individual skill levels 
enabled us to control for individual heterogeneity. There is ample evidence of heterogeneity in 
individuals’ preferences and skills (e.g. Bandiera et al., 2005; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2009; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010; Bellemare et al., 2008; Fehr and Goette, 2007; Mas and 
Moretti, 2009), implying that the statistical power may be limited if one cannot control for these 
individual differences. 
Finally, our results also indicate that laboratory and field evidence are not in conflict with 
each other. If we control for workers’ fairness perceptions, workers in the field reciprocate on 
average higher wages with higher performance – as they do in the laboratory. Likewise, workers 
who display reciprocal responses in the laboratory are those who also show reciprocal responses in 
the field. Our results thus also lend support to the notion that laboratory results generalize to field 
settings. In fact, as we mentioned above, laboratory preference measures even help us better 
understand the heterogeneity in field responses.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the design of our 
experiment and the setting in which it takes place. Section III presents the empirical findings and 




II. The Experimental Setup 
This section describes the institutional backdrop against which we conduct our field experiment. It 
also provides a first descriptive look at the data, performs randomization checks and describes our 
empirical strategy. 
II.A The institutional background 
We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a publishing company during the market 
launch of a novel daily newspaper. The publishing company commissioned a promotion agency to 
organize a sales promotion for its new product over a period of three months in the city of Zurich, 
Switzerland. Workers’ task during the sales promotion was to distribute copies of the newspaper to 
passers-by at public places such as bus stops, train stations and pedestrian areas. Workers could 
freely choose when to work, but they had to indicate their availability three to four weeks in 
advance, and once they had signed up for particular shifts they were not allowed to switch or cancel 
their chosen shifts. Workers had to sign up for blocks of three hours (4pm to 7pm) from Monday to 
Friday. Before the sales promotion began, all workers had agreed to work for CHF 22 per hour. 
The workers were managed by team leaders with whom they met at the beginning and end 
of the shifts at the assigned locations. Due to the size of the sales promotion, the agency divided the 
city into two equally-sized sectors (I and II) that covered about the same number of locations. Team 
leaders and workers were sometimes assigned to work in different locations but they always stayed 
within the same sector. During the shifts, team leaders visited the locations to ensure that the 
workers did not run out of newspaper copies. They also had to check in an unobtrusive way that 
workers would not throw copies away. No such incident occurred. Another important task of the 
team leaders was to record the number of copies each worker distributed during a shift. Team 
leaders knew how many copies each worker had received at the beginning and if necessary also 
during a shift and they counted the remaining copies when a shift ended. Neither workers nor team 
leaders knew that they were part of an experiment. 
We deliberately choose a work environment where explicit performance incentives were 
absent and where reputational or repeated game incentives were unlikely to play a role in order to 
cleanly identify whether workers voluntarily reciprocate higher wages with greater effort. Workers 
earned a performance-independent hourly wage. They also had no prospect for future employment 




II.B The randomized wage increase 
We implemented two treatments. In the baseline treatment, denoted by “CHF22”, workers received 
their regular hourly wage of CHF 22. In the main treatment, denoted by “CHF27”, the publishing 
company raised workers’ hourly wage by CHF 5. The treatments were communicated to the workers 
shortly before the beginning of a shift with both a postcard and a text message. We used two 
communication channels to ensure that every worker was informed about the relevant wage. Text 
messages were sent a few minutes prior to a shift and postcards were handed out by the team 
leaders at the start of the shifts. The message in treatment CHF22 reminded the workers to retain 
the straps from the distributed newspaper bundles. The request to keep the straps allowed team 
leaders to collect the numbers of distributed copies more quickly. In treatment CHF27 the message 
included the straps reminder and additionally informed the workers about the pay raise. 
Importantly, the message made it clear that the publishing company, and not the promotion agency, 
was paying the workers the higher wage: the messages concluded with the name of the publishing 
company and the postcards bore its logo. Because most workers worked on an irregular basis (e.g., 
on Monday in one week but on Wednesday and Thursday in another week) we communicated the 
relevant wage daily, shortly before the beginning of a shift. 
The field experiment took place over a four-week period towards the end of the sales 
promotion. We exploited the spatial division of the city into sectors between which the workers 
could not move to randomize the two treatments across the two sectors. We chose to randomize 
the wages on a sector-week level (see Figure 1). Thus, in each of the four experimental weeks the 
workers in one sector received the higher wage (treatment CHF27), while those in the other sector 
served as a control and were paid the base wage (treatment CHF22). The weekly rotation of the 
treatments served two purposes. First, compared to a less frequent rotation, a weekly rotation 
allows for a more robust identification of confounding time effects, which could have been large if 
the newspaper had become better known over time. Second, we expected a strong turnover after 
the second week of the experiment because summer vacation in the schools was beginning at this 
time. A weekly rotation therefore also helped generate within-subjects variations in pay, enabling us 
to control for individual–specific factors that affect workers’ productivity. While the majority of the 
workers experienced both wages, it is unlikely that the workers were able to anticipate the wages 
they were paid during the experimental period. First, there was no communication between workers 
from different sectors. Second, the weekly rotation of the wages during the experimental period was 
repeated only once and constituted a small part of the entire sales promotion. Finally, workers had 
highly irregular workdays making it implausible that they could see through the wage pattern of the 
experimental period.  
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Towards the end of the sales promotion, the promotion agency sent a feedback form to the 
workers, asking them to state their opinion about the working conditions. One question of particular 
interest to us asked the workers to rate the fairness of the wages: “I consider the regular (higher) 
hourly wage of CHF 22 (27) for doing this job to be [1 = very unfair, 2 = moderately unfair, 3 = neither 
… nor, 4 = moderately fair, 5 = very fair]”. This information serves us as a manipulation check, as it 
allows us to examine the effectiveness of our fairness manipulation. In order to get truthful answers, 
workers were asked to fill in the form without writing their name on it. 
II.C The follow-up survey and laboratory experiment 
Two months after the conclusion of the field experiment, we conducted a follow-up survey among 
the workers. The survey asked a variety of questions related to temporary work (see Appendix). 
Participants were paid CHF 7 for completion. They first had to indicate up to three employers from 
the previous six months (which covered the time period of the sales promotion), and then answer 
several questions relating to each of their listed employers. The questions of key interest to us asked 
the participants to state the wage they were effectively paid and the wage they considered to be fair 
for their work: “What hourly wage did you earn at employer X?” and “What hourly wage would you 
find appropriate for doing this job at employer X?”. By subtracting the answers of the first question 
from the second, we are able to construct an individual measure of perceived underpayment. The 
workers had no reason to believe that the survey was in any way connected to the field experiment 
conducted two months earlier. They did not know that they had been part of an experiment and the 
survey was administered by researchers whom they perceived to be completely unrelated to the 
publishing company.  
At the end of the survey we measured workers’ inclination towards reciprocal fairness by 
inviting them to participate in a simplified version of the moonlighting game played for real money 
(Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2000). This two-player sequential-move game has the important 
feature that both kind and unkind actions are feasible for both players. In our version of the game, 
the first-movers could divide CHF 24 in three different ways: they could choose between (i) an unfair 
allocation (CHF 18 for the first-mover and CHF 6 for the second-mover), (ii) an equitable allocation 
(CHF 12 for both players), or (iii) a generous allocation (CHF 6 for the first-mover and CHF 18 for the 
second-mover). The second-movers could then reward or punish the first-movers by assigning up to 
two positive or negative points, respectively; they could also decide not to assign any points at all. 
The reward and punishment technology was designed in a way such that one positive (negative) 
point cost the second-mover CHF 2 and increased (decreased) the first-mover’s payoff by CHF 6. The 
game was played one-shot; second-mover behavior therefore captures reciprocal fairness without 
repeated game effects. For the purposes of this study, we assigned all workers to the role of the 
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second-mover and elicited their decisions using the strategy method.5 We classify the workers as 
positively reciprocal if they returned more positive points in the generous allocation than in the 
equitable allocation, or more positive points in the equitable allocation than in the unfair allocation. 
Thus, to be counted as a positively reciprocal type, the assignment of positive points needs to be a 
(weakly) increasing function of the second-mover’s payoff, with a strictly positive slope in at least 
one of the two comparisons (unfair vs. equitable, equitable vs. generous).  
II.D Descriptive statistics and randomization checks 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data used in this paper. We observed 196 individuals 
during the four experimental weeks of the sales promotion. More than 70 percent of the workers 
were female. Workers were between 16 and 42 years old, with an average age of 22.5 years. Most of 
them were Swiss citizens. On average, they completed 6.5 shifts and distributed 228 newspaper 
copies per hour. Table 1 also shows that the experimental conditions were well balanced within 
individuals. Workers’ median exposure to the higher wage was 50 percent of the shifts; the 25th 
percentile of the distribution was 42 percent, and the 75th percentile was 66 percent.  
Turning to the fairness perception of wages, we asked in the follow-up survey what wage 
workers would consider appropriate for this type of job. The average reply was CHF 1 more than the 
CHF 22 paid in the baseline treatment. This judgment, however, is not uniform, as can be seen in the 
histogram in Figure 3. It shows the distribution of the difference between what workers considered 
to be the appropriate wage and the base wage of CHF 22. Slightly less than half of the workers 
considered the base wage as the appropriate wage. The majority of the workers (53 percent) 
perceived themselves to be underpaid at the base wage of CHF 22, with a sizable group of workers 
(20 percent) perceived CHF 25 to be the appropriate wage.  
The last panel in Table 1 displays the average back transfer in the moonlighting game. In 
response to the generous allocation of “CHF 6 for the first-mover, CHF 18 for the second-mover” the 
workers spent an average of 0.89 positive points to increase the first-mover’s payoff. They spent on 
average 0.25 positive points if the first-mover chose the equitable allocation (CHF 12, CHF 12). If the 
first-mover chose the unfair allocation (CHF 18, CHF 6), the workers spent 0.56 negative points to 
reduce the first-mover’s payoff. Table 1 also displays the results separately for the reciprocal (N = 
77) and the non-reciprocal (N = 41) participants. There are large quantitative differences between 
these two groups. This is because many of the non-reciprocal individuals act strictly selfish, never 
                                                            
5 The choices of the first-movers in the moonlighting game were collected through a survey mailed to a random sample of 
students at the University of Zurich around the same time.  
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spending any points. Others display a concern for efficiency and always transfer the same number of 
positive points. 
We present various checks that verify that we successfully randomized subjects to treatment 
conditions. As explained above, the assignment of workers to shifts and locations was organized in a 
way that made it nearly impossible for them to selectively pick shifts in treatment CHF27. 
Nevertheless, we need to verify whether the worker characteristics in the two treatments were 
identical, because imbalances in these characteristics could also create treatment differences in 
effort. It is therefore important to know whether workers’ characteristics are balanced across 
treatments. Table 2 shows that this is the case. Worker characteristics in the two treatments are 
statistically identical for every dimension we measured (e.g., underpayment judgments, age, gender, 
etc.).  
Most importantly, we need to establish that there was no selectivity with respect to the 
number of shifts worked as a function of the treatment, as this would complicate our empirical 
analysis below. As we explained earlier, the rule was that the workers had to sign up for shifts well in 
advance. This makes it difficult for workers to select into treatments. The results in Table 3 confirm 
that there was no selectivity. The table reports the results from a regression where the number of 
shifts a worker completed in each treatment is the dependent variable. The results show that the 
workers worked on average the same number of shifts in the two treatments. They worked 3.1 shifts 
in the CHF22 treatment; the dummy for the CHF27 treatment is small and far from significant: it is 
equal to 0.18, with a standard error of 0.13 in column (1). Thus, we would have been able to detect 
even small differences of 0.26 shifts across groups, which is less than 5 percent of the 6.2 shifts 
worked altogether. We consider this a “tightly estimated zero”: the number of shifts worked in the 
two treatments is statistically indistinguishable. This result also holds if we control for individual 
fixed effects (see column 2 in Table 3).  
In Table 4 we check the randomization to treatments from a different angle. The promotion 
agency had difficulties filling the available shifts; shifts remained vacant in roughly 20 percent of 
cases. It would have been easier for the company to fill the higher wage shifts if workers had self-
selected into treatment CHF27. Table 4 shows, however, that this was not the case. In this table the 
number of unfilled shifts in each sector for each day of the study is the dependent variable. The 
results show that the coefficient of the CHF27 dummy is close to zero and insignificant, indicating 
that treatment CHF27 had no effect on the share of unfilled shifts. Thus, there was no selectivity into 
the number of shift worked.  
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We also examine whether the experimental conditions affect our underpayment measure 
and workers’ willingness to reciprocate in the moonlighting game. It is important to check whether a 
higher exposure to one of the treatments influenced our underpayment measure (i.e., the difference 
between the wage deemed to be appropriate and the base wage) and our measure of reciprocity. If 
they did, we could not use these measures as independent variables in our regressions described 
below. Column (1) in Table 5 shows that the fraction of shifts during which a worker is exposed to 
treatment CHF27 has no effect on our underpayment variable. Thus the small differences in 
exposure to the CHF27 treatment did not affect subsequent fairness judgments of wages. Columns 
(2) – (4) in Table 5 examine whether the exposure to the CHF27 treatment affects workers’ behavior 
in the moonlighting game for the three possible transfers of the first-mover. Since the choices in the 
three cases are probably highly correlated, this needs to be taken into account when calculating the 
standard errors. We therefore estimate the three equations as seemingly unrelated regressions, 
thus allowing arbitrary correlation in the residual across the three choices. Taken individually, the 
results in each of the columns show no significant influence of the CHF27 treatment on workers’ 
second-mover behavior. We also perform a joint test of the hypothesis that the exposure to the 
CHF27 treatment did not affect back transfers in any of the three cases by estimating all three 
regressions using a seemingly unrelated regression model. The p-value of the hypothesis of no effect 
in all three equations is 0.58. We thus conclude that variations in the exposure to the higher wage 
neither influence our underpayment measure nor workers’ behavior in the moonlighting game, and 
this thus allows us to use these measures as independent variables in our empirical analysis. 
II.E The empirical strategy 
Approaching and addressing passers-by requires effort. Therefore, the number of copies distributed 
is our measure of individual effort. Since we have shown in Tables 3 and 4 that our treatment did not 
affect the number of shifts worked, this implies that there is no selectivity into work with respect to 
the treatment. We can focus directly on labor supply conditional on having chosen to work. We first 
estimate the average treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance using the 
following regression model: 
(1)  log(𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable is the log of the number of hourly copies distributed by worker i at 
location k on day t. Our key exogenous variable is the wage condition in which a worker was 
working, which is represented by the treatment indicator CHF27 for the high wage condition. Its 
coefficient 𝛽1 (multiplied by 100) can thus be interpreted as the percentage change in workers’ 
performance that is caused by the wage increase. We include an exhaustive set of fixed effects 𝜆𝑘 as 
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controls for the location at which a worker i worked on day t. We also include day fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 for 
each day of the experiment.  
Our experimental wage increase guarantees that the treatment indicator is uncorrelated 
with the residual 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡  and that the OLS estimator will satisfy the conditional-mean independence 
needed for convergence to the true parameter. It does not, however, imply that the residual is 
uncorrelated across observations, thus raising potential issues with the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients. Standard OLS procedures require that the residual be independent between 
any two observations. Two potential sources of correlation for the residual in our application are 
serial correlation within an individual, and correlations among the residuals of spatially close 
observations on the same day. Temporary, but auto-correlated shocks to an individual’s motivation 
may induce serial correlation in an individual’s performance on the job and thus render the 
assumption of independence of the residuals within an individual invalid. The residuals may also be 
spatially correlated because one could imagine that if a swarm of commuters heads in one direction, 
this affects the pick-up rate of the newspaper of spatially close workers in a similar way. This 
introduces a spatial correlation into the residuals of geographically close workers (Conley, 2008). In 
this case, because the residual is uncorrelated with the treatment, the treatment effect can still be 
estimated consistently by using OLS. However, the standard errors provided by standard OLS 
routines will be wrong, and, potentially, biased downward (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We use 
Hsiang’s (2010) non-parametric correction for spatial and temporal correlation in order to correct for 
the two potential problems and to obtain the correct standard errors without imposing further 
restrictions on the covariance matrix. This procedure is very similar to multi-way clustering in that it 
allows for any form of spatial and serial correlation, but uses a kernel estimate of the covariance 
matrix in which spatially close observations can be defined. We chose a radius of 3 kilometers in our 
application, and place no constraints on the number of lags for the individual.6  
To take account of individual differences, we also estimate a variant of equation (1) with 
individual fixed effects 𝜈𝑖  included:  
(2)   log(𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 . 
                                                            
6 An omnibus way to fix this problem would be to cluster observations along two dimensions: individuals and 
week×region. However, this correction is valid asymptotically, as the number of week x region cluster gets large. We only 
have 8 week×region cells and thus this is unfeasible (we are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out). Our 
correction allows arbitrary correlations within an individual, and spatially correlated residuals across different individuals 
on the same day. The only difference between our correction and the one suggested here is only that ours does not allow 
the residual of individual i on day t to be correlated with the residual of another individual on a different day in that week. 
It is difficult to imagine how one newspaper distributed today by one vendor could have an effect on the number of 
newspapers another vendor would distribute in the future. Thus, we are comfortable restricting ourselves to the slightly 
more restrictive formulation we have chosen here.  
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Including the individual fixed effects is not strictly necessary, as the treatments are randomized. But 
it provides a way to check whether the precise specification of the model affects the conclusions of 
any of our results and also potentially provides more precision.  
In a second step of the analysis, we investigate individual heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect. Specifically, we examine how workers’ perceived fairness of the base wage affects their 
performance response to the wage increase. In keeping with our specifications above, we estimate 
the following regression model:  
(3)  log(𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 × Δi + 𝛽3Δi + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 , 
where Δi measures worker i’s perceived underpayment, i.e., the difference between what worker i 
considered to be a fair wage for this job and the wage he was paid in the baseline treatment. In this 
case, 𝛽1 (multiplied by 100) can be interpreted as the percentage change in workers’ performance 
that is triggered by the wage increase if the worker feels adequately paid in the baseline treatment, 
i.e., if Δi = 0. The coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽2 indicates the extent to which perceived 
underpayment affects workers’ response to the wage increase. We also estimate the same equation 
including individual fixed effects rather than a control for Δi: 
(4)  log(𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2 I(𝐶𝐻𝐹27)𝑘𝑡 × Δi + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡 . 
This specification allows for fully flexible control for possibly non-linear effects of Δi on performance.  
III. Results 
The literature on social preferences suggests that the extent to which higher wages lead to higher 
effort depends on whether and how higher wages are associated with an increase in the perceived 
fairness the wage. We therefore begin the exposition of our results by presenting the effect of the 
wage increase on workers perceived fairness of their wage. We then turn to the average treatment 
effect of the wage increase on worker productivity, and assess the robustness of this result. Finally, 
we probe deeper into the psychological mechanisms that underlie the observed pattern in the data. 
III.A The impact of the wage increase on workers’ perceived fairness of the wage 
Data from the feedback form collected during the experiment point to a strong impact of the wage 
increase on workers’ perceived fairness of their pay. Panel (A) in Figure 2 shows that roughly 30 
percent of the workers perceived the base wage as unfairly low, while Panel (B) in this figure 
indicates that less than 2 percent reported the same for the higher wage. Moreover, comparing the 
two panels reveals that there is a clear shift to a fairer assessment of pay in treatment CHF27 (p < 
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0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).7 However, there is strong heterogeneity in the fairness perception 
of the base wage. The strongest shift in the distribution of fairness assessments comes from the 
bottom end of the distribution, meaning that the higher wage had the largest impact on those 
workers who considered the base wage to be unfairly low. But there is also a large group of workers 
for whom the higher wage could not improve their perceived fairness of the wage; those workers 
already perceived the base wage as rather fair and considered the higher wage to be equally fair.  
As discussed earlier, in the follow-up survey conducted two months after the experimental 
period of the sales promotion we find similar individual heterogeneity in fairness perceptions. Figure 
3 shows that more than half of the workers perceived themselves to be underpaid at the base wage, 
implying that a large number of the workers accepted the job even though they thought that pay 
was unfairly low. About one-third of the workers considered themselves to be adequately paid, 
while only few (12 percent) thought they were overpaid for this job. Because we know from every 
worker the wage that is considered as fair (“appropriate”) we can also calculate how many workers 
felt underpaid at CHF 27. We find that only 3 out of 119 individuals felt underpaid at this wage. Thus, 
we have established 
Result 1:  The wage increase is associated with an increase in the perceived fairness of pay on 
average. However, there is strong heterogeneity in workers’ fairness perceptions. 
The wage increase raises the perceived fairness of pay particularly among workers 
who evaluate the base wage as unfairly low.  
III.B The average treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
We now turn to the behavioral effects of the wage increase and begin by investigating its average 
impact on performance. First evidence is shown in Figure 4, which displays the average performance 
in the two treatments. For ease of comparison, we subtract the mean productivity at the location in 
question for each observation; a zero thus corresponds to the average performance in a particular 
location. Since we take the natural logarithm of these numbers, they can be interpreted directly as 
the percentage differences to the location mean. The figure suggests a positive average treatment 
effect. In response to the wage increase, workers increased their performance by about 4 percent on 
average. The standard errors of the means are rather small, and error bands do not overlap across 
treatments, possibly indicating that the effect is statistically significant. However, these standard 
errors do not exploit the other controls available to us and are possibly biased due to temporal and 
spatial correlations within the residual, as explained in section II.E. We thus turn to the regression 
                                                            
7 All p-values reported in this paper are two-sided. 
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estimates that resolve these issues. The first column of Table 2 shows the estimation results for 
equation (1). The estimated average treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
is 3.7 percent. Column (2) of this table shows the estimates with individual fixed effects based on 
equation (2). The point estimate of the average treatment effect is slightly lower, but still significant 
at the 5-percent level. Thus, we have established:  
Result 2:  The wage increase has a positive and significant impact on workers’ performance on 
average. 
The point estimates we obtain are roughly in line with the point estimates founds in earlier studies 
that use comparable treatments (Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube et al., 2012; Kube et al., forthcoming). 
However, the previous studies did not find significant effects – perhaps because of the smaller 
sample sizes and the use of between-subject designs. 
Next we present some robustness checks for Result 2. Some studies suggest that gift 
exchange has an emotional component that may dissipate over time with the consequence that the 
extra effort may wear off (Falk, 2007; Gneezy and List, 2006). We address this hypothesis by 
including into equation (1) both a control variable for the number of previous shifts in treatment 
CHF27 and its interaction with the treatment dummy. Column (1) of Table 7 shows the results when 
we allow the treatment effect to be a function of workers’ previous experiences with the higher 
wage. The coefficient on treatment CHF27 can be interpreted as the average impact of the wage 
increase when workers encountered the increase for the first time. The estimate is positive and 
significant, and somewhat larger than the estimate of the overall treatment effect. However, there is 
little evidence on a diminishing gift exchange effect, as indicated by the small and insignificant 
coefficient on the interaction term and considering that on average the workers worked three shifts 
in each treatment. Thus, taking into account the number of previous shifts in treatment CHF27 does 
not support the conjecture that workers’ initial responses to the higher wage are systematically 
different than their subsequent responses. 
In a further step, we investigate whether the performance difference between the two wage 
conditions is driven by workers being disappointed about falling back to the base wage after having 
encountered the higher wage. Because some studies indicate that reference points and loss aversion 
affect labor supply (Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman, 2011; Fehr and Goette, 2007), one may argue 
that experiencing the higher wage causes workers to upwardly adjust the wage they think they are 
entitled to, and consequently, they may consider the removal of the wage increase as a loss in 
earnings and because of loss aversion they adjust their effort more strongly than when they receive 
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the wage increase. We have already established that workers’ duration of exposure to the higher 
wage did not influence their perceived underpayment at the base wage. We proceed on 
investigating reference point effects by estimating equation (1) but excluding observations (and also 
the subsequent ones) that occurred when workers switched back to the base wage. Column (2) of 
Table 7 shows a positive and significant coefficient on treatment CHF27 that is even larger than the 
estimated coefficient for the total sample. Thus, if anything, workers were more responsive to 
introducing than removing the higher wage. Taken together, the results suggest that the wage 
increase was perceived as a gift that triggered positive reciprocity in the form of higher effort.  
III.C Heterogeneous treatment effects of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
In contrasts to reciprocity models, a key ingredient of the fair wage-effort hypothesis by Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990) is that only the workers who feel underpaid at the base wage should respond to the 
higher wage with higher effort. We therefore investigate whether heterogeneous fairness 
perceptions lead to heterogeneous effort responses to the wage increase. Figure 5 displays the 
treatment effect separately for two types of workers: the workers who considered the base wage to 
be fair and those who considered it to be unfairly low. The figure shows that the workers who felt 
adequately paid at the base wage (including the few who felt overpaid) did not react to the wage 
increase at all, while those who perceived the base wage as inadequately low increased their 
performance by about 7 percent. Judging by the error bands, the figure suggests that the impact of 
the wage increase is significant for the second group, but not for the first. To better understand the 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect we estimate equation (3) where we include an interaction 
term between treatment CHF27 and the underpayment measure, denoted by Δ𝑖. Because we need 
to restrict the sample to individuals who completed the follow-up survey, we first replicate the 
average treatment effect without taking account of the underpayment perceptions, in order to show 
that the workers who completed the follow-up survey responded in exactly the same way to the 
wage increase as all others did. As can be seen in column (1) of Table 8, the point estimate on 
treatment CHF27 is identical to that in column (1) of Table 6. Column (2) of Table 8 now presents the 
estimates of equation (3) that includes the interaction of treatment CHF27 with Δ𝑖. The estimate of 
𝛽1 is not significant, implying that the workers who felt adequately paid at the base wage (i.e., 
Δ𝑖 = 0) did not respond to the wage increase. However, workers who felt underpaid responded 
quite strongly. The estimate of 0.019 for 𝛽2 is highly significant and implies that workers’ 
performance response to the wage increase gets stronger with every Swiss franc that a worker felt 
underpaid at the base wage. We also estimate the model with individual fixed effects as described in 
equation (4). In this specification, reported in column (3) of Table 8, the point estimate of 𝛽1 is again 
close to zero and insignificant. However, the point estimate of 𝛽2 is positive and significantly 
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different from zero (p = 0.01). It implies that for every Swiss franc that a worker felt underpaid, 
workers’ response to the higher wage increases by 0.018. Thus, for a worker who considered the fair 
wage to be CHF 27 (as many did), the response is 0.005 + 5 × 0.018 = 0.095 or 9.5 percent; this effect 
is almost three times as large as the average treatment effect. Thus, the workers who felt underpaid 
at the base wage responded very differently to the wage increase than those who felt adequately 
paid – a finding that highlights the importance of heterogeneous fairness perceptions in our 
understanding of the mechanism behind the motivational effects of pay raises. We summarize this 
finding in 
Result 3:  There is strong heterogeneity in workers’ response to a wage increase. Workers who 
perceive themselves to be underpaid at the base wage raise their performance 
significantly when they are paid a higher wage, while workers who feel adequately 
paid or overpaid at the base wage do not respond to a wage increase. 
In the following, we present a robustness check for Result 3 that examines the role of 
workers’ individual ability in the treatment effect. We are particularly interested in the hypothesis 
that high ability workers have different underpayment perceptions compared to low ability workers. 
If, for example, high ability workers are more likely to perceive themselves to be underpaid, the 
interpretation of the positive impact of perceived underpayment on the performance response to 
the wage increase becomes more ambiguous – perhaps it is workers’ ability and not their fairness 
perceptions that drive the underpayment effect.  
We first examine whether there is a correlation between a measure of individual ability and 
underpayment perceptions. We use the worker fixed effects 𝜈𝑖  from equation (2) as a measure of 
worker ability. Workers with a high 𝜈𝑖  are, on average, more productive than those with a low 𝜈𝑖. We 
find that the correlation between workers’ individual 𝜈𝑖’s and their underpayment measure is close 
to zero and insignificant (Spearman rank correlation: 0.029, p = 0.75). This provides a first hint that 
ability is an unlikely explanation for the underpayment effect. We further examine the role of ability 
more formally in Table 9. For ease of comparison, column (1) of this table presents again the 
underpayment effect. To examine the role of ability, we divide the workers into two groups: workers 
with a 𝜈i above the median (= high-ability), and those with a 𝜈𝑖  below the median (= low-ability). We 
then re-estimate equation (1) but include a dummy variable for the high-ability workers as well as an 
interaction of this dummy variable with the indicator for treatment CHF27. The results in column (2) 
of Table 9 show that the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant, indicating that compared 
to the low-ability workers the high-ability workers did not respond differently to the wage increase. 
We conclude this robustness check by estimating a model that includes the underpayment variable, 
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the ability variable, as well as their interactions with the treatment indicator. The results in column 
(3) of Table 9 demonstrate again that workers’ abilities do not drive the underpayment effect. While 
the point estimate of the underpayment interaction remains robustly positive and significant, the 
ability interaction is still insignificant. Taken together, highly skilled workers did not respond 
differently to the higher pay than did less skilled workers. Moreover, controlling for ability does not 
affect the relationship between perceived underpayment and workers’ performance response to the 
higher wage. 
The way perceptions of fairness mediate the behavioral response to treatment CHF27 is 
consistent with the fair-wage effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). This hypothesis stipulates 
that reciprocal workers respond to an improvement in their pay by increasing effort up to the point 
where they feel treated fairly. However, a necessary condition for this to be true is that individuals 
have a preference for reciprocal fairness. Our survey experiment shows that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in reciprocity concerns between individuals: while 77 participants can be classified as 
reciprocal in the moonlighting game, 44 cannot: their back transfers do not depend on the 
generosity of the first-mover. Thus, if our “laboratory” measure of reciprocal fairness captures 
individuals’ general propensity to reciprocate favors, the performance response to the higher wage 
and the way in which this is mediated by the perceived fairness of the wage should also differ 
between these two groups.  
To test this hypothesis, we first check whether underpayment perceptions differ between 
the two groups. The test results show that reciprocal workers and non-reciprocal workers do not 
differ in their underpayment judgments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.92). Thus, any difference in 
the impact of underpayment perceptions on the performance response to the wage increase cannot 
be due to such differences. Next, we estimate equation (4) separately for the reciprocal and the non-
reciprocal workers.8 Table 10 displays the results. We first turn to the estimates for the reciprocal 
individuals in column (1). As before, we find no significant effect of the wage on performance when 
workers perceived themselves to be adequately paid or overpaid. The coefficient 𝛽1 on the main 
effect of treatment CHF27 is small and insignificant. However, we find that fairness perceptions play 
an even stronger role in workers’ performance response to the wage increase. The coefficient of the 
interaction term, 𝛽2, is now 0.028, implying that workers’ performance response to the higher wage 
increases by 0.028 with every Swiss franc that a worker felt underpaid at the base wage. Thus, an 
individual who felt underpaid by CHF 5 at the base wage displayed a performance response of 14 
                                                            
8 We also estimated interaction effects for reciprocal and non-reciprocal workers, but we decided to report the results in 
separate equations for expositional simplicity. Estimating interaction effects yields the same conclusions. However, 
because the reciprocal and non-reciprocal workers may differ in dimensions other than reciprocal fairness that could affect 
productivity, we estimate the model with individual fixed effects as described in equation (4) in order to control for such 
unobservable differences.   
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percent which is almost four times as large as an average individual. For reciprocal individuals, the 
performance response to a wage increase therefore strongly depends on their fairness perceptions. 
By contrast, the estimates for the non-reciprocal individuals in column (2) show no evidence that 
their performance response depends on fairness perceptions. The point estimate is even negative, 
but not significant. The data reject the hypothesis that fairness perceptions mediate the response to 
the wage increase the same way for reciprocal and non-reciprocal individuals, i.e., that 𝛽2𝑅 =  𝛽2𝑁𝑅 (p 
= 0.01). Notice, however, that the non-reciprocal group exhibits a more blurred estimate of the 
response to the wage increase in the absence of underpayment. The estimate of 𝛽1𝑁𝑅 = 0.018 with a 
standard error of 0.023. Yet, even when taking this blurriness into account, we reject the hypothesis 
that (𝛽1𝑅 ,𝛽2𝑅)′ =  (𝛽1𝑁𝑅 ,𝛽2𝑁𝑅)′  in a joint F-test (p = 0.04). Furthermore, we easily reject the 
hypothesis that the wage increase does not affect the reciprocal group of workers (p = 0.02), while 
we cannot reject the null of no response for the non-reciprocal workers. Thus, it is only the 
reciprocal group of workers who respond to the wage increase, and this response takes the form of 
the fair-wage effort hypothesis. This pattern is statistically different from what we observe for the 
non-reciprocal workers, even though we cannot characterize the non-reciprocal workers’ behavior 
with much precision. For this last group, our best interpretation is that they do not respond to the 
wage increase. We summarize these results in  
Result 4: There is considerable heterogeneity in workers’ preferences for reciprocal fairness. 
Underpaid reciprocal workers strongly increase their performance when they are paid a 
higher wage, while the pattern is significantly different for non-reciprocal workers: even 
when feeling underpaid, non-reciprocal workers do not respond to a wage increase.  
This result thus lends further support to our interpretation of the fair-wage effort 
mechanism. It is also important because it provides evidence against the interpretation that the 
observed responses are driven by repeated-game effects, and that the results should not be 
interpreted as evidence of social preferences. In a repeated game, even the selfish types have an 
incentive to raise effort because it may pay to do so if one considers the employer’s response in the 
future. By contrast, we do not find that the non-reciprocal workers respond to the wage increase at 
all, suggesting that they do not see any gain from working harder in response to the higher wage. 
 
Conclusion 
The conditions under which workers reciprocate higher wages with higher effort are of considerable 
importance for the functioning of labor markets (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In this 
paper, we combine a field experiment that examines the impact of a wage increase on workers’ 
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performance with both survey measures of workers’ fairness perceptions and a laboratory measure 
of workers’ preferences for positive reciprocity. The combination of these tools enables us to acquire 
deeper insights into the role of these factors for workers’ effort response to wage increases. Our 
results suggest that the perceived fairness of the base wage plays an important role in mediating the 
response to a wage increase. Workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their 
effort in response to a wage increase, while those who feel fairly paid or overpaid do not respond to 
the higher wage. The role of fairness perceptions helps us reconcile our results with previous 
evidence that did not find a significant effect of a wage increase on performance (Gneezy and List, 
2006; Kube et al., 2012; Kube et al., forthcoming). In these studies the base wage was already rather 
high relative to wages in alternative jobs, meaning that workers may have perceived the base wage 
as already quite fair.  
We also show that the performance response to the wage increase and the role of fairness 
perceptions is robust to controls for workers’ skill levels. We find that it neither increases nor 
significantly decreases over time, in contrast to Gneezy and List (2006), suggesting that their result 
does not easily generalize across occupations. In addition, we identify another important source of 
heterogeneity in workers’ effort response to a wage increase. We find that only those workers 
whom we identify as reciprocal individuals in a laboratory two-player game respond to the wage 
increase with higher performance, while those whom we identify as non-reciprocal and selfish leave 
their performance unchanged irrespective of whether they feel underpaid or not.  
Because the workers knew that their job will last only a few weeks, reputational or repeated 
game effects are unlikely to explain their behavior. Moreover, theories that explain the observed gift 
exchange exclusively in terms of workers’ self-interest have problems explaining the important role 
of fairness perceptions and reciprocal preferences for workers’ reciprocation behavior. Reputation 
incentives should be effective for selfish workers as well. Yet, our results show no evidence than 
selfish workers react to the wage increase, thus also making repeated-game interpretations less 
plausible. In this sense, our results also illustrate the usefulness of combining laboratory and survey 
methods with field experiments in order to identify psychological mechanisms that may be at work 
in the field. 
The insights gained from this study point to new directions for future research. Our study 
shows that the composition of the work force in terms of perceived underpayment and reciprocity 
crucially determines the effectiveness of higher wages. This suggests that much can be gained by 
studying the determinants of workers’ fairness perceptions and how firms can shape them through 
wage and non-wage instruments. Kube et al. (2012) have taken an interesting step in this direction. 
Their data indicate that non-monetary gifts or thoughtfully prepared cash gifts elicit much stronger 
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performance responses from the workers than simply giving money. This suggests that the extent to 
which workers reciprocate a gift from their employer depends not only on the economic value of the 
gift but also on its signaling value. Finally, little is known about how compensation executives can 
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Figure 1: Timing of events 
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This figure visualizes the two phases of the study. The first phase consists of the randomized wage 
increase that took place during the four experimental weeks of the sales promotion and a feedback 
form that was administered towards the end of the experimental period. We randomized wages on a 
sector-week level. Thus, for a given week the workers in one sector received the higher wage 
(treatment CHF27), while those in the other sector served as a control and were paid the base wage 
(treatment CHF22). In a second phase, we invited the workers to participate in a survey on part-time 
work that allowed us to measure both their perceived underpayment at the base wage and their 





Figure 2: Workers' fairness assessments of the base and higher wage 
 
The figure shows workers’ fairness ratings of the base wage (CHF22) and the higher wage (CHF27) on a 



































Figure 3: Workers’ perceived underpayment at the base wage 
 
This figure shows a histogram of the difference between what the workers considered to be the 
appropriate wage and the base wage of CHF 22 per hour. A positive number indicates that a worker felt 
underpaid at the base wage, while a negative number indicates that the worker perceived to be 




Figure 4: Average treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
 
This figure shows workers’ average performance and standard error of the mean in each treatment. 
Performance is measured as the hourly copies distributed normalized by the average hourly copies 
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
 
This figure displays workers’ average performance and standard error of the mean in each treatment, shown 
separately for the workers who felt adequately paid at the base wage and those who felt underpaid. Workers’ 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD N 
Hourly copies distributed 227.7 83.9 1269 
Number of shifts 6.5 4.2 196 
Percentage of shifts worked in CHF27 52.5 23.4 196 
Fairness rating of CHF22 2.9 0.8 113 
Fairness rating of CHF27 3.9 0.9 113 
Perceived underpayment (in CHF) 1.1 2.1 119 
Age (in years) 22.5 4.7 114 
Male (in %) 27.2 44.7 114 
Foreigner (in %) 13.2 34.0 114 
Number of siblings  1.4 0.9 114 
Secondary school (in %) 61.4 48.9 114 
Apprenticeship/vocational school (in %) 28.1 45.1 114 
Additional, further education (in %)  21.1 40.9 114 
Baccalaureate (in %) 67.5 47.0 114 
Technical school (in %) 23.7 42.7 114 
University (in %) 22.8 42.1 114 
Points returned if 1st mover proposed (18, 6) -0.56 1.05 118 
Points returned if 1st mover proposed (12, 12) 0.25 0.73 118 
Points returned if 1st mover proposed (6, 18) 0.89 0.89 118 
    
Reciprocial individuals:     
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (6, 18) 1.25 0.63 77 
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (12, 12) 0.27 0.60 77 
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (18, 6) -0.92 0.81 77 
Non-reciprocal individuals:    
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (6, 18) 0.22 0.91 41 
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (12, 12) 0.22 0.94 41 
   Points returned if 1st mover proposed (18, 6) 0.12 1.12 41 
This table describes the data used in this paper. The data come from three different sources: the sales promotion, the 
feedback form, and the follow-up survey that includes the moonlighting game. 196 workers were observed during the four 
experimental weeks; 113 of them returned the feedback form and 119 of them completed the follow-up survey. In the 
follow-up survey, five workers did not answer the questions on personal characteristics and one worker did not participate 






Table 2: Randomization check for worker characteristics 
 Treatment  
 CHF22 CHF27  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Perceived underpayment (in CHF) 1.1 (2.1) 1.1 (2.1) 0.69 
Age (in years) 23.4 (5.3) 23.3 (5.4) 0.77 
Male (in %) 28.1 (45.0) 26.7 (44.3) 0.68 
Foreigner (in %) 16.1 (36.8) 17.2 (37.8) 0.70 
Number of siblings 1.4 (0.9) 1.4 (0.9) 0.91 
Secondary school (in %) 64.8 (47.8) 63.3 (48.3) 0.69 
Apprenticeship/vocational school 
(in %) 33.1 (47.1) 30.8 (46.2) 0.52 
Additional, further education 
(in %)  24.8 (43.2) 24.2 (42.9) 0.85 
Baccalaureate (in %) 61.8 (48.7) 65.8 (47.5) 0.27 
Technical school (in %) 25.1 (43.4) 21.1 (40.9) 0.22 
University (in %) 24.5 (43.1) 21.1 (40.9) 0.29 
Points returned if 1st mover 
proposed (18, 6) -0.65 (1.02) -0.66 (1.00) 0.98 
Points returned if 1st mover 
proposed (12, 12) 0.25 (0.73) 0.25 (0.68) 0.88 
Points returned if 1st mover 
proposed (6, 18) 0.81 (0.90) 0.86 (0.89) 0.46 
Because of the within-subject design most workers participated in both treatments. It was possible, however, that some 
workers worked x times (shifts) in treatment CHF22 and y times (shifts) in treatment CHF27. Therefore, our randomization 
check takes this into account, i.e., the characteristics of this worker count x times for treatment CHF22 and y times for 
treatment CHF27. This is a very conservative randomization check because showing insignificant differences in worker 
characteristics across treatments would be much easier if we were to count each worker only once. The first four columns 
in this table show the treatment averages and standard deviations of worker characteristics. The last column contains the 





Table 3: Participation at the individual level during the experiment 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Number of shifts per treatment 
CHF27 0.189 0.189 
 (0.130) (0.184) 
   
Intercept 3.143*** 3.143*** 
 (0.162) (0.092) 
   
Fixed effects   
   Worker No Yes 
   
N 392 392 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the individual level. The unit of observation is a worker in 
each treatment. The dependent variable is the number of shifts per treatment and CHF27 is an indicator variable for 





Table 4: Participation at the sector-day level during the experiment 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Fraction of unfilled shifts per day 
CHF27 0.008 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
   
Intercept 0.193*** 0.193*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) 
   
Fixed effects   
   Sector No Yes 
   Day Yes Yes 
   
N 40 40 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the day level. The unit of observation is a day in each 
treatment. The dependent variable is the fraction of unfilled shifts per day and CHF27 is an indicator variable for treatment 




Table 5: Randomization check for outcomes measured after the field experiment 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Perceived underpayment  Points returned if 1
st mover proposed 
 (18, 6) (12, 12) (6, 18) 
Fraction of shifts in 
CHF27 
0.190  0.008 0.180 0.497 
(0.684)  (0.431) (0.299) (0.360) 
      
Intercept 0.992**  -0.564** 0.155 0.617*** 
 (0.431)  (0.256) (0.178) (0.214) 
      
N 119  118 118 118 
Column (1) reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses, while columns (2) to (4) report the estimates of 
seemingly unrelated regressions. Throughout all columns, the independent variable is workers’ exposure to treatment CHF27 
indicated as the fraction of shifts they worked under the higher wage. In column (1) the dependent variable is the perceived 
underpayment at the base wage, and in columns (2) to (4) the dependent variable is workers’ back-transfers in the 





Table 6: Average treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: log (hourly copies distributed) 
CHF27 0.037 0.030 
 (0.017)** (0.018)** 
   
Intercept 5.608 5.269 
 (0.090)*** (0.084)*** 
   
Fixed effects   
   Worker  No Yes 
   Location  Yes Yes 
   Day  Yes Yes 
   
N 1269 1269 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses take account of serial correlation within an individual’s residuals and spatial 
correlation among the residuals of spatially close observations on the same day (up to a distance of 3 km). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed and serves as our performance measure. The variable 
CHF27 is an indicator variable for the treatment in which the workers were paid the higher wage. The levels of significance 





Table 7: Robustness checks for habituation and reference point effects 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: log (hourly copies distributed) 
CHF27 0.060 0.079 
 (0.024)** (0.026)** 
   
No. of previous CHF27 shifts 0.011  
 (0.005)**  
   
CHF27 × No. of previous CHF27 shifts -0.010  
 (0.006)  
   
Intercept 5.590 5.654 
 (0.088)*** (0.094)*** 
   
Fixed effects   
   Worker  No No 
   Location  Yes Yes 
   Day  Yes Yes 
   
N 1269 645 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses take account of serial correlation within an individual’s residuals and spatial 
correlation among the residuals of spatially close observations on the same day (up to a distance of 3 km). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed and serves as our performance measure. The variable 
CHF27 is an indicator variable for the treatment in which the workers were paid the higher wage. The variable “No. of 
previous CHF27 shifts” captures the number of previous shifts a worker had already received the higher wage. Column (2) 
replicates the estimation results in column (1) of Table 6 while excluding observations (and also the subsequent ones) that 





Table 8: Heterogeneous treatment effect of the wage increase on workers’ performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: log (hourly copies distributed) 
CHF27 0.039 0.018 0.005 
 (0.019)** (0.023) (0.020) 
    
CHF27 × Δi   0.019 0.019 
  (0.008)** (0.007)** 
    
Δi   0.001  
  (0.006)  
    
Intercept 5.619 5.633 5.317 
 (0.113)*** (0.108)*** (0.130)*** 
    
Fixed effects    
   Worker  No No Yes 
   Location  Yes Yes Yes 
   Day  Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 722 722 722 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses take account of serial correlation within an individual’s residuals and spatial 
correlation among the residuals of spatially close observations on the same day (up to a distance of 3 km). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed and serves as our performance measure. The variable 
CHF27 is an indicator variable for the treatment in which the workers were paid the higher wage. The variable Δi is the 
difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the base wage. The interaction term CHF27 × Δ𝑖 thus 
measures the treatment effect as a function of workers’ perceived underpayment. The levels of significance are * p < 0.10, 






Table 9: Robustness check for ability effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: log (hourly copies distributed) 
CHF27 0.018 0.022 0.007 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) 
    
CHF27 × Δi  0.019  0.021 
 (0.008)**  (0.008)** 
    
Δi  0.001  -0.006 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
    
CHF27 × High-ability (= 1)  0.030 0.016 
  (0.045) (0.046) 
    
High-ability (= 1)  0.232 0.238 
  (0.032)*** (0.033)*** 
    
Intercept 5.633 5.410 5.427 
 (0.108)*** (0.111)*** (0.117)*** 
    
Fixed effects    
   Worker  No No No 
   Location  Yes Yes Yes 
   Day  Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 722 722 722 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses take account of serial correlation within an individual’s residuals and spatial 
correlation among the residuals of spatially close observations on the same day (up to a distance of 3 km). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed and serves as our performance measure. The variable 
CHF27 is an indicator variable for the treatment in which the workers were paid the higher wage. The variable Δi is the 
difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the base wage. “High-ability” is an indicator variable for 
worker ability, which takes the value one if a worker’s fixed effect is above the median, and zero otherwise. The interaction 
term CHF27 × Δ𝑖 measures the treatment effect as a function of workers’ perceived underpayment, while the interaction 






Table 10: The effect of the wage increase on the performance of reciprocal vs. non-reciprocal 
workers 
 (1) (2) 
Sample: Reciprocal workers Non-reciprocal workers 
Dependent variable: log (hourly copies distributed) 
CHF27 0.000 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
   
CHF27 × Δi  0.028 -0.010 
 (0.012)** (0.009) 
   
Intercept 5.036 5.928 
 (0.148)*** (0.231)*** 
   
Fixed effects   
   Worker Yes Yes 
   Location Yes Yes 
   Day Yes Yes 
   
N 466 243 
OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses take account of serial correlation within an individual’s residuals and spatial 
correlation among the residuals of spatially close observations on the same day (up to a distance of 3 km). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed and serves as our performance measure. The variable 
CHF27 is an indicator variable for the treatment in which the workers were paid the higher wage. The variable Δi is the 
difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the base wage. The interaction term CHF27 × Δ𝑖 thus 
measures the treatment effect as a function of workers’ perceived underpayment. Column (1) shows the estimates for 
reciprocal workers, while column (2) shows the same for non-reciprocal workers. The levels of significance are * p < 0.10, 













Scientific study on part-time employment in Switzerland 
 
 
Dear Madam or Sir 
 
The University of Zurich selected you to participate in a scientific study. The study consists of a 
decision section – you can make decisions here – and a questionnaire. With your participation in 
this study, you will help us in better understanding the situation of part-time employees. We thus 
sincerely hope that you will participate. Furthermore, by participating in the study – with the 
careful and comprehensive completion of the decision part and the questionnaire – you can earn 
up to CHF 25. 
 
Please first read the description of the decision part. Then complete the decision sheets and the 
questionnaire. Finally, please place the decision sheets and the questionnaire in the stamped reply 
envelope and return everything to us. 
 
When we receive your reply envelope (with the decision sheets and questionnaire), we will send you 
the amount you earned in cash by mail. Any data we collect will be used for scientific purposes only 
and processed in an entirely anonymous form. We guarantee that no other person will have access 
to this data. 
 
If you have any questions (e.g., about completing the decision sheets), we will be pleased to assist 




Thank you for participating!      
 
Sincerely  




THE DECISION SITUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This part of the study is about the distribution of a monetary amount between two people and 
reward and punishment. You will form a group of two with another, randomly chosen person. 
The other person must first decide how the monetary amount of CHF 24 will be divided between the 
two of you. You then have the opportunity to respond to the other person’s decision by assigning 
him or her bonus or minus points. You may also refrain from assigning any points at all. 
We guarantee anonymity in all decisions. This means that you will never learn of the other person’s 
identity, and he or she will never learn of your identity. We also guarantee that all monetary 
amounts earned based on the decisions will actually be paid to you or to the other person. 
 
How can the other person allocate the CHF 24?  
The other person has three different possibilities for allocating the CHF24. He or she can 
• keep CHF 18 for him/herself and give CHF 6 to you, or 
• keep CHF 12 for him/herself and give CHF 12 to you, or 
• keep CHF 6 for him/herself and give CHF 18 to you.  
 
What can you decide? 
You can assign the other person up to two positive or negative points, or you can do nothing, i.e., 
not assign any points. 
 
Positive points: Each positive point that you assign to the other person increases his or her 
payment – with respect to the proposed allocation of money – by CHF 6 and costs 
you CHF 2. For example, if you assign two positive points, the other person’s 
payoff is increased by CHF 12 and it will cost you CHF 4. You can thus reward the 
other person with positive points. 
 
Negative points: Each negative point that you assign to the other person decreases his or her 
payment – with respect to the proposed allocation of money – by CHF 6 and costs 
you CHF 2. For example, if you assign two negative points, the other person’s 
payoff is decreased by CHF 12 and it will cost you CHF 4. You can thus punish the 
other person with negative points. 
 
No points: In this case, the other person neither receives any positive points nor negative 






B. SOME EXAMPLES 
Here you will find some examples for calculating the monetary outcomes:  
Example 1: the other person keeps CHF 18 for him/herself and gives you CHF 6. 
• If, for example, you assign the other person two negative points, you will reduce his or her 
payoff by CHF 12 and it will cost you CHF 4. The other person will now have 18 – 12 = CHF 6 and 
you will earn 6 – 4 = CHF 2. 
• If, for example, you assign the other person two positive points, you will increase his or her 
payoff by CHF 12 and it will cost you CHF 4. The other person will now have 18 + 12 = CHF 30 and 
you will earn 6 – 4 = CHF 2. 
• If you do not assign any points, the other person earns CHF 18 and you earn CHF 6. 
 
Example 2: the other person keeps CHF 6 for him/herself and gives you CHF 18. 
• If, for example, you assign the other person one positive point, you will increase his or her payoff 
by CHF 6 and it will cost you CHF 2. The other person will now have 6 + 6 = CHF 12 and you will 
earn 18 – 2 = CHF 16. 
• If, for example, you assign the other person one negative point, you will reduce his or her payoff 
by CHF 6 and it will cost you CHF 2. The other person will now have 6 – 6 = CHF 0 and you will 
earn 18 – 2 = CHF 16. 
• If you do not assign any points, the other person earns CHF 6 and you earn CHF 18. 
 
 
C. PROCEDURAL DETAILS 
We ask that you determine how many positive or negative points you will assign or whether you will 
not assign any points for all of the 3 possible allocations the other person may propose.  
 
• Case 1: The other person keeps CHF 18 for him/herself and gives you CHF 6 
• Case 2: The other person keeps CHF 12 for him/herself and gives you CHF 12 
• Case 3: The other person keeps CHF 6 for him/herself and gives you CHF 18 
The other person’s decision determines which case is relevant for your payment. The documentation 
for the study was sent to a large number of people, and we thus do not yet know which decision the 
other person has made. If, for example, the other person keeps CHF 12 for him/herself and gives 
CHF 12 to you, case 2 becomes relevant. 
Please take note that there are no correct or wrong decisions in this decision situation. It is 
important to us that you carefully think about your decisions and that you complete all requested 
decisions. Please make your decisions on your own and do not discuss them with others, such as 






Your total income from this study consists of 
1) the earnings from the decision part (up to CHF 18) and 
2) a fixed sum of CHF 7 for completion of the questionnaire. 
 
How will you get your money? 
As soon as we receive the response envelopes from the participants, we will calculate your income. 
You will receive your earnings in cash per mail. 
 
 
E. YOUR DECISION SHEET 
 
Your decision for case 1: 
The other person keeps CHF 18 for him/herself and gives you CHF 6. 
 
I assign the following points for this case: 
(Please check one of the boxes below) 
2 negative points 
□ 




1 positive point 
□ 




Your decision for case 2: 
The other person keeps CHF 12 for him/herself and gives you CHF 12. 
 
I assign the following points for this case: 
(Please check one of the boxes below) 
2 negative points 
□ 




1 positive point 
□ 




Your decision for case 3: 
The other person keeps CHF 6 for him/herself and gives you CHF 18. 
 
I assign the following points for this case: 
(Please check one of the boxes below) 
2 negative points 
□ 




1 positive point 
□ 







Please answer the questions below with respect to your part-time employment in the last 6 months 
for up to 3 employers (if you have had more than 3 employers, please answer the questions with 
respect to the 3 most important ones; if you have had fewer than 3 employers, you can leave the 
corresponding fields for employer 2 and employer 3 empty). 
 
1) Name your part-time employers in the last 6 months. 
Employer 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Employer 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Employer 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
2) What tasks did you do? 
I worked as _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ with employer 1. 
I worked as _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ with employer 2. 
I worked as _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ with employer 3. 
3) How many hours per week did you work with each employer? 
I worked for _ _ _ _ _ hours per week with employer 1. 
I worked for _ _ _ _ _ hours per week with employer 2. 
I worked for _ _ _ _ _ hours per week with employer 3. 
4) For how many months would you like to continue working for your present part-time 
employer? 
I would like to work for a further _ _ _ _ _ months with employer 1. 
I would like to work for a further _ _ _ _ _ months with employer 2. 







5) What where your gross hourly wages? 
My gross hourly wage was CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour with employer 1. 
My gross hourly wage was CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour with employer 2. 
My gross hourly wage was CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour with employer 3. 
6) What gross hourly wage would be appropriate for doing your work? 
I consider the wage of CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour to be appropriate for doing my task with employer 1. 
I consider the wage of CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour to be appropriate for doing my task with employer 2. 
I consider the wage of CHF _ _ _ _ _ per hour to be appropriate for doing my task with employer 3. 
7) Do you find your part-time work to be exciting and fulfilling or a bit frustrating? 







Employer 1 □ □ □ □ □ 
Employer 2 □ □ □ □ □ 
Employer 3 □ □ □ □ □ 
8) How strongly do you identify yourself with your employers? 
 Very weakly Somewhat weakly Neutral 
Somewhat 
strongly Very strongly 
Employer 1 □ □ □ □ □ 
Employer 2 □ □ □ □ □ 
Employer 3 □ □ □ □ □ 
 
9) Do you feel challenged in your part-time jobs? 







Employer 1 □ □ □ □ □ 
Employer 2 □ □ □ □ □ 




10) In general, how hard was it for you to find a part-time job? 
Very difficult Somewhat difficult Neutral 
Somewhat 
easy Very easy 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
Finally, we have a few questions about you.  
• Which year were you born in?  _ _ _ _ _ 
• What is your gender?    
      
 
 
• Were you born in Switzerland?  





• If not, for how many years have you been living in Switzerland? 
I have been living in Switzerland for _ _ _ _ _ years. 
• How many siblings do you have? 
I have _ _ _ _ _ siblings. 
• Which education levels have you completed? Please mark all of the completed courses of 
education and training. 
□ Primary school/ mandatory education □ High school 
□ Secondary school □ College 
□ Apprenticeship/vocational school □ University 
□ Additional, further education □  
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